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I. INTRODUCTION

The Florida Constitution mandates "a just valuation of all property
for ad valorem taxation" and directs that the legislature prescribe the
rules to be followed in securing such valuation.' Although "just
valuation" is not necessarily synonymous with "fair market value," the
legislature codified the Florida Supreme Court holding in Walter v.
Schuler,2 that for this purpose the two concepts are one and the same
This determination is neither unprecedented nor surprising. Ad valorem
taxes are typically based on the fair market value of the taxed property
(or, in some states, on a fixed percentage of fair market value) because
such valuation is consistent with one of the defining norms of a just tax
system-similarly situated persons should be similarly taxed." As it

* David M. Richardson is a Professor of Law at the University of Florida College of
Law. He expresses his thanks to Benjamin K. Phipps, II, and Professor David M. Hudson, for
reviewing and commenting on a draft of the essay and to his research assistants, Douglas
Delaney and William Wiery.
1. FLA. CoNST. art. VII, § 4.
2. 176 So. 2d 81, 85 (Fla. 1965).
3. See FLA. STAT. § 192.001(2) (1995) (" 'Assessed value of property' means an annual
determination of the just or fair market value of an item of property....").
4. The concept of requiring "equal treatment of equals" is referred to as horizontal equity.
Louis Kaplow, A Note on Horizontal Equity, 1 FLA. TAX REV. 191, 191 (1992).
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relates to ad valorem taxation, this horizontal equity norm requires that
properties of equal fair market value bear the same tax burden.'
It is in the determination of fair market value that problems arise.'
The fair market value of real property, for instance, depends on a variety
of factors, including the property's size, location, and potential use.
These are among eight factors the Florida legislature has directed
property appraisers to consider in arriving at fair market value.7 The
statutory factors also include the three basic methods of valuing real
property-comparable sales, replacement cost, and capitalization of
income The value assigned to a particular property under the statutory
approach depends heavily on the weight given by an appraiser to each
of the eight factors. This subjectivity can lead to a wide range of
theoretically plausible values, and it inevitably leads to disagreements
between property appraisers and property owners as to the actual "fair
market value" of property.
To resolve such disagreements, Florida statutes provide both an
administrative forum-the value adjustment board 9 -and a judicial
forum-the circuit courts.'0 For all matters arising out of tax rolls
before January 1, 1997, however, property owners enter either forum at
a decided disadvantage because there is an extraordinary presumption
5. It has been argued that horizontal equity has no normative content apart from and is
a natural derivative of vertical equity--"the proper redistribution [of tax burden] among
unequals." Id. Others have suggested that neither horizontal nor vertical equity has "independent
normative content, and that content must be supplied by reference to economic assumption and
a theory of justice." Paul A. McDaniel & James R. Repetti, Horizontal and Vertical Equity: The
MusgravelKaplow Exchange, 1 FLA. TAX REv. 607, 621 (1993). Whatever one concludes about
the role of horizontal and vertical equity in shaping tax policy, it is difficult to challenge Richard
Musgrave's assertion that "[t]he general principle of [horizontal equity] is almost universally
accepted." Richard A. Musgrave, HorizontalEquity: A FurtherNote, I FLA. TAX REV. 354, 355
(1993).
6. See FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 12D-1.002(2) (1997) (defining just value):
"Just Value"-"Just Valuation," "Actual Value" and "Value"-Means the price
at which a property, if offered for sale in the open market, with a reasonable
time for the seller to find a purchaser, would transfer for cash or its equivalent,
under prevailing market conditions between parties who have knowledge of the
uses to which the property may be put, both seeking to maximize their gains
and neither being in a position to take advantage of the exigencies of the other.
Somewhat more comprehensive definitions are set out in the manuals and dictionaries of the
Association of Assessing Officers. See, e.g., THE APPRAISAL INSTITUTE, THE DICTIONARY OF
REAL ESTATE APPRAISAL (3d ed. 1993).
7. FLA. STAT. § 193.011 (1995).
8. FLA. STAT. § 193.011.
9. FLA. STAT. §§ 194.011-.037 (1995).
10. FLA. STAT. §§ 194.171-.231 (1995).
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in favor of the property appraiser's value. According to the Florida
Supreme Court, this presumption can be overcome only "by appropriate
and sufficient allegations and proofs, to the exclusion of every reasonable hypothesis of legal assessment."' 2 This extraordinary burden of
proof--"to the exclusion of every reasonable hypothesis of legal
assessment" 3 -- appears similar to the burden of proof--"beyond a
reasonable doubt"--placed on the state in criminal matters.
For matters arising out of tax rolls on or after January 1, 1997, the
extraordinary burden of proof has been replaced by legislation imposing
a two-tier burden of proof. Under the new regime, the burden will be
either "clear and convincing evidence," or a "preponderance of the
evidence."' 4 As is discussed below, it remains to be seen how much, if
any, relief the two-tier burden provides.
The difficulty in contesting property appraisers' values is compounded by the fact that it is not economically feasible to engage in such a
contest unless there is a large valuation differential.' 5 Valuation
differentials large enough to warrant the cost and risk of a challenge
typically occur only with property worth millions of dollars. As a consequence of both the burden of proof on the property owner and the cost
of valuation challenges in relation to the potential savings, administrative and judicial review of property appraisers' determinations, though
facially reasonable, for all practical purposes, is not an option for many
property owners.
The resulting de facto delegation to the property appraiser of
essentially unreviewable authority to determine tax liability has created
the untenable situation. Florida property owners who are unsuccessful
in convincing the property appraiser to change his valuation voluntarily
may be denied protection from mistaken, abusive or even purposeful
overvaluations. 6 Not only is this elemental right denied, but also the
11. See Powell v. Kelly, 223 So. 2d 305, 307 (Fla. 1969) (stating that the courts normally
do not interfere with the appraiser's administrative discretion).
12. Id. at 308.
13. Id.; see also Homer v. Dadeland Shopping Ctr., Inc., 229 So. 2d 834, 837 (Fla. 1969)
(expressing same burden of proof). Consequently, the Florida Administrative Code imposes the
extraordinary burden on property owners seeking administrative relief from the value adjustment
board. See FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 12D-10.003(3) (1997) (citing Homer, 229 So. 2d at 834).
14. 1997 Fla. Laws ch. 97-85, § 3 (to be codified at FLA. STAT § 194.301 (1997)).
15. For example, a homeowner who thought his home had been overassessed by $10,000
would have at stake only $250 of tax in a county with a typical 25 mill tax. Even a property
owner who thought his property was overassessed by $100,000 would have only $2500 at stake.
Even considering the possible multi-year impact, this is hardly enough, particularly if part of the
burden is shifted to the federal government through a deduction on the taxpayer's federal income
tax return, to warrant a full-scale judicial assault against the appraiser's valuation.
16. See David M. Hudson, Florida'sPropertyAppraisers, 7 NOVA L.J. 477, 479 (1983)
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fundamental tax policy goal of achieving horizontal equity is ignored. 7
Persons who own identical parcels of property may bear different tax
burdens because the owner of the overvalued parcel has no effective
recourse.
It is highly unlikely that either Floridians or their legislative
representatives, if given the choice, would opt for this imperial
appraisersystem of allocating the burden of ad valorem taxes. Indeed,
last year, the Florida legislature recognized and tried to ameliorate the
problem when it passed House Bill 557." The bill would have replaced
the extraordinary burden of proof with the lower, fairer, and more
realistic "preponderance of the evidence" burden. 9 Unfortunately,
Governor Chiles vetoed the bill.2 ° As is discussed below, his stated
reasons for vetoing H.B. 557 were political and were unmitigated by
concerns of tax policy, equity, fairness or constitutional spirit.2
The purpose of this essay is to examine briefly the Florida Supreme
Court's basis for closing the courthouse doors in valuation disputes and
to suggest that the doors need to be reopened. What will become
apparent is that the Court has lost sight of the just valuation mandate
that the people of Florida, when they consented to the taxation of
property, assumed would result in a fair distribution of the tax burden.
A task force, created by Governor Chiles when he vetoed H.B. 557,
proposed legislation to address the burden of proof problem,' and that
proposal was enacted into law early this year.' The potential effectiveness of the new law is also examined in this essay. 4
The ultimate conclusions of this essay are that, without providing
effective recourse to an independent administrative or judicial review of
property appraisers' valuations, Florida's ad valorem tax system is
fundamentally flawed and that additional corrective legislation is
necessary for the system to regain its moral authority. A strong
argument can be made in favor of adopting the preponderance of the
evidence standard. The recently enacted two-tier burden of proof' is
(suggesting that property appraisers be made employees of the Department of Revenue and that
their duties be transferred to the Department in order to achieve equality and uniformity in ad

valorem taxation).
17. See supra notes 4-5 and accompanying text.
18. H.B. 557, S.B. 740 (Fla. 1996).
19. Id.
20. FLORIDA AD VALOREM TASK FORCE, REPORT TO THE GOVERNOR AND THE
LEGISLATURE 2 (1997) (hereinafter TASK FORCE REPORT].
21. See infra pt. III.C.
22. TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 20, at 2-3.
23. See 1997 Fla. Laws ch. 97-85, § 3 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 194.301 (1997)).
24. See infra pt. IV.
25. 1997 Fla. Laws ch. 97-85, § 3.
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commendable in that it both recognizes and attempts to deal with the
problem. However, it adds complexity and inappropriately creates two
classes of property owners-those who can prove overvaluations by the
preponderance of the evidence and those who must meet the higher
standard of clear and convincing evidence."
I1. CLOSING THE COURTHOUSE DOORS
In the often cited case of Powell v. Kelly," the Supreme Court of
Florida premised its statement of the extraordinary burden on the fact
that "mere excessive valuation, resulting solely from inadvertence or
mistaken judgment, and unaffected by any element of illegality in matter
of law, or intentional or other abuse of authority, or fraud, express or
2' On
implied, will not suffice as a ground of equitable jurisdiction."
this point, the Court's opinion is unassailable. The jurisdictional
restraints on courts of equity have been firmly planted in the law for
hundreds of years. Consider, for instance, how closely the Supreme
Court's statement in Powell reflects the 1822 opinion in the New York
case of Mooers v. Smedley.29 The Chancellor in that case said:
I cannot find, by any statute or precedent or practice, that
it belongs to the jurisdiction of chancery, as a court of
equity, to review or control the determination of the
supervisors in their examination and allowance of accounts
as chargeable against their county, or any of its towns, and
in causing the moneys so allowed to be raised and levied.
There was no allegation of fraud or corruption in the case.
The most that could be said was that they made an erroneous determination.' °
After establishing that courts in equity have no jurisdiction over
"excessive valuation, resulting solely from inadvertence or mistaken
judgment,"'" the Powell court then defined the limited circumstances
in which it would nonetheless assume jurisdiction and substitute its own
judgment for that of the property appraiser.32 It would do so only if the

26.
27.
28.
29.

1997 Fla. Laws ch. 97-85, § 3.
223 So. 2d 305 (Fla. 1969).
Id. at 307 (emphasis added).
6 Johns. Ch. 28 (N.Y. Ch. 1822).

30. Id. at 37.
31. Powell, 223 So. 2d at 307.

32. Id. at 307-08.
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property owner set forth proof that the property had been overvalued,
"to the exclusion of every reasonable hypothesis of legal assessment."33
Unfortunately, this rule, which was intended to describe only the
limited circumstances in which an equity court would take jurisdiction
of a complaint based on a claim of administrative error, has metamorphosed into a universally applicable barrier in Florida to independent
review of property appraisers' values.34 Thus, even if the aggrieved
property owner seeks relief administratively, he is faced with an
extraordinary burden.3
Furthermore, the property appraiser has the right, under certain
circumstances, to petition the circuit court for review of the value
adjustment board's determination.36 In such a case, the property
owner's victory in the administrative forum may be pyrrhic because the
circuit court is likely to force the property owner to again meet the
extraordinary burden.37 The Florida Statutes provide that in the case of
an appeal to the circuit court from a decision of the value adjustment
board, "the burden of proof shall be upon the party initiating the
action."3 The Third District Court of Appeal has said that, in spite of
the express statutory mandate, if the property appraiser can demonstrate
that he considered the eight criteria, then the burden of proof shifts back
to the property owner.39 That burden, the Third District Court of
Appeal said, is the familiar extraordinary burden.' The reason for this
is that the presumption in favor of the property appraiser is not founded
on "statutory procedures designed by the Legislature to provide
relief'; 4 rather, it is founded on the fact that property appraisers are
33. Id. at 308; accordFolsom v. Bank of Greenwood, 97 Fla. 426, 429-30, 120 So. 317,
318 (Fla. 1929).
34. See FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 12D-10.003(3) (1997) (establishing a heightened
burden of proof).
35. Id.
36. FLA. STAT. § 194.036(l) (1995).
37. Vero Beach Shores, Inc. v. Nolte, 467 So. 2d 1041, 1044 (Fla. 4th DCA 1985);
Bystrom v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y of the United States, 416 So. 2d 1133, 1146 (Fla.
3d DCA 1982) (Pearson, J., joined by Hubbard, C.J., concurring in part).
38. FLA. STAT. § 194.036(3) (1995). The court's review will be de novo. FLA. STAT. §
194.036(3).
39. See Bystrom, 416 So. 2d at 1145 (Pearson, J., joined by Hubbard, C.J., concurring in
part). In such cases, the value adjustment board's determination has been held to be meaningless.
Vero Beach Shores, 467 So. 2d at 1044.
40. See Bystrom, 416 So. 2d at 1145 (Pearson, J., joined by Hubbard, C.J., concurring in
part).
41. Id. (Pearson, J., joined by Hubbard, C.J., concurring in part). The Court reached this
conclusion in spite of the authority granted to the legislature in Article VII, Section 4 of the
Florida Constitution to prescribe by general law the rules necessary to "secure a just valuation
of all property for ad valorem taxation." FLA. CONST. art. VII, § 4. It is not obvious that a
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constitutional officers and that public policy dictates that there is no
equitable
, 42jurisdiction for correcting " 'mere excessive overvalu-

ation.'

At this point, it should be noted that before 1969, the circuit courts
in Florida had jurisdiction in equity to consider appeals of property
appraiser valuations.43 In 1969, the legislature amended Florida Statutes
section 194.171 to shift jurisdiction "of all matters relating to property
taxation" from courts of equity to courts of law.' Since jurisdiction has
been shifted to courts of law, of what continuing relevance is the rule
of Powell and its predecessors45 that established the limited jurisdiction
of the equity courts?
This question was summarily answered several years ago by the
Florida Supreme Court in Section 3 Property Corp. v. Robbins.46
Probably the single most significant difference between courts of equity
and courts of law, is that jury trials are available in courts at law but not
in courts of equity. The question in Section 3 Property Corp. was
whether a property owner had a constitutional right to a jury trial in a
circuit court proceeding to challenge the grant of an agricultural
exemption by the property appraiser.47 The Court said that "It]he mere
fact that section 194.171 proclaims that the circuit courts have original
jurisdiction at law of all matters relating to taxes does not evidence the
legislature's intent to mandate jury trials in ad valorem tax assessment
cases. The entire statutory tax procedures dictate otherwise."48 The
Court concluded that, in spite of the change in the language of the
statute, there was no right to a jury trial.49

presumption of correctness in favor of the decision of a constitutional officer mandates a
particular level of burden of proof, much less a burden so high that, in effect, the officer's
valuation discretion is absolute.
42. See Bystrom, 416 So. 2d at 1146 (Pearson, J., joined by Hubbard, C.J., concurring in
part) (quoting Powell, 223 So. 2d at 307).
43. See Section 3 Property Corp. v. Robbins, 632 So. 2d 596, 596 (Fla. 1993) (stating that
the Powell decision was made when the taxation of real property was "sounded in equity").
44. See id. at 596-97.
45. See supra text accompanying notes 27-34.
46. 632 So. 2d 596 (Fla. 1993).
47. Id.
48. Id. at 596-97 (emphasis added).
49. Id. at 597. Although no written history has been found to support this view, Benjamin
K. Phipps, II, of Tallahassee, who was counsel to the Tax Committee and who drafted the
language that was ultimately adopted, has said that the purpose of the change was in fact to
provide jury trials in such cases. See also Department of Revenue v. The Printing House, 644
So. 2d 498, 500 (Fla. 1994) (concluding that taxpayers have no right to a jury trial when
contesting tax assessments but they do have such right in a refund suit).
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Thus, for valuation disputes arising out of tax rolls before January 1,
1997, there was little solace for property owners in Florida. The Florida
courts, at every turn, protected property appraisers. The extraordinary
burden of proof was imposed not only in circuit courts but also by the
value adjustment board.5" A favorable outcome for the property owner
in the value adjustment board proceeding was no guarantee that the
extraordinary burden would not be imposed again if the property
appraiser contested the board's decision in the circuit court."' Furthermore, a favorable outcome in circuit court was no guarantee that the
extraordinary burden would not be imposed again in the appellate
courts.52 Finally, even though the circuit courts now have jurisdiction
at law, taxpayers are not entitled to a jury trial in valuation disputes. 3
III. RATIONALE FOR REOPENING THE COURTHOUSE DOORS
With Florida courts so supportive of property appraisers, it became
the task of those who believe the imperialproperty appraisersystem to
be violative of the spirit of the constitutional mandate of just valuation' to demonstrate that the system must be changed. To this end, the
following four points are discussed below. First, the chain of authorities
on which Powell directly or indirectly relies55 supports the proposition
that even though the equity courts generally do not have jurisdiction,
other recourse was not only available to aggrieved property owners but
was considered a necessary component of a just system. 6 Second, by
changing the inquiry from "what is the fair market value of the
property," to the much different question (which can lead to much
different valuations) of "whether the value proposed by the property
appraiser is supported by any reasonable hypothesis of legality," the
Florida Supreme Court has violated not only the spirit but also the letter
of the Constitution. 7 Third, if the reasons why Governor Chiles vetoed
H.B. 557 were ever meritorious, they no longer are. Fourth, considering the purpose for assigning a particular burden of proof in various
litigation matters, it cannot be said that so much is at stake in ad
50. See supra text accompanying notes 31-35.
51. See supra text accompanying notes 36-42.
52. Robbins v. Summit Apartments Ltd., 589 So. 2d 460, 461 (Fla. 3d DCA 1991);
Markham v. June Rose, 495 So. 2d 865, 866 (Fla. 4th DCA 1986); Vero Beach Shores, 467 So.
2d at 1044; Bystrom, 416 So. 2d at 1141.
53. Section 3 Property Corp., 632 So. 2d at 596-97.
54. FLA. CONST. art. VII, § 4.

55. See supra text accompanying notes 27-33.
56. See infra pt. III.A.
57. See infra pt. III.B.
58. See infra pt. IH.C.
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valorem tax disputes as to warrant imposing a high burden, much less
the extraordinary burden, on property owners. 9
A. Other Recourse
That the judges on whose opinions the Florida Supreme Court
directly or indirectly relied in Powell knew the importance of providing
some recourse can be demonstrated easily.' In Mooers, the Chancellor
did not say that administrators' determinations were never reviewable.'
He only said that such review "has always been a matter of legal, and
never a matter of equitable, cognizance."'62 He went so far as to lament
the fact that he did not have the broad range of remedies available in a
law court.63
Twenty-five years later, in New York, an act of the legislature
subjected to property tax, for the first time, rents reserved in certain
leases." In Livingston v. Hollenbeck,65 the question arose as to whether the procedure then available, which permitted property owners to
submit an affidavit of value that would be binding on the property
appraiser, was applicable to such reserved rents.' Also at issue was the
value placed by the appraiser on the reserved rents in question.67 As to
the alleged erroneous valuation, the court said that it "[knew] of no
equitable power existing in the court, to review [the determination of
value] and correct the error."68 As to the question of the applicability
of the alternative administrative remedy, the court said that "[s]uch a
provision is necessary to the protection of the rights of the citizen
against mistake or abuse." 9 The court went on to say that "the right to
make the affidavit of value is indispensable to a just administration of
the law. Indeed there is no other remedy: no other means are provided
for redress."7

59. See infra pt. III.D.
60. See Powell, 223 So. 2d at 307 (stating that although in most cases the courts will not
interfere in the administrative discretion of the property appraisers, in cases involving fraud or
illegality, the courts may act).
61. Mooers, 6 Johns. Ch. at 31.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 32.
64. Livingston v. Hollenbeck, 4 Barb. 9, 11-12 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1847).
65. 4 Barb. 9 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1847).

66. Id. at 10.
67. Id. at 11.
68. Id. at 16.

69. Id. at 13.
70. Id.
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Significantly, in City of Tampa v. Palmer,7 ' on which the Florida
Supreme Court directly relied in Powell, the Court said:
The law does not assume that the assessor is infallible, nor
that his valuations shall be conclusive, but contemplates that
he might err, and therefore provides the means for correcting his errors and equalizing his values both by statutes
requiring property owners to return their properw for
taxation and statutes creating boards of equalization.
The facts indicated that the taxpayer had neither made a return as
required by the applicable law nor availed herself of the available
administrative route to challenge the appraiser's valuation.73 The Court
said that "[t]he presumption is that the Board of Equalization would
the valuations, if excessive, had such application been
have corrected
74
made."
These cases make it clear that equity courts, including the Florida
Supreme Court, were aware of the importance of providing independent
review of property appraisers' determinations. The judges writing these
opinions recognized the harshness of the jurisdictional limits of equity
courts and believed that "other remedies" were essential. Unfortunately,
in its recent decisions, the Florida Supreme Court has simply ignored
this "other recourse" element found in the reasoning of the authorities
it cites in support of limiting judicial review of property appraiser valuations. 5
B. The New "Non-Constitutional" Question
One of the most disturbing consequences of the rule in Powell was
that it shifted the focus away from the constitutionally mandated quest
for "just valuation," to the question of whether the aggrieved property
owner can demonstrate the absence of any reasonable hypothesis of
legality supporting the property appraiser's value.76 Given the wide
71. 89 Fla. 514, 105 So. 115 (Fla. 1925).
72. Id. at 528, 105 So. at 120.
73. Id. at 530-31, 105 So. at 120-21.
74. Id. at 531, 105 So. at 121. Furthermore, the Court pointed out that the determination
of value by the property assessor "and the equalization thereof by a board of equalization, are
administrative acts, involving the exercise of administrative discretion, and a court of equity will
not in general control that discretion." Id. at 529, 105 So. at 120. As is discussed below, the rule
that courts of equity will not, except in unusual circumstances, overturn a decision by the board
of equalization (now known as the value adjustment board) has been summarily ignored in
recent decisions. See Vero Beach Shores, 467 So. 2d at 1044.
75. See supra pt. II.
76. See supra text accompanying notes 6-8.
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range of values that can be obtained by applying the several accepted
valuation methods, it was quite possible that the method used by the
appraiser would produce a value significantly higher than actual "fair
market value," and yet the property owner would not be able to
establish the negative-that there is no "reasonable hypothesis"
supporting the appraiser's value."
If, for instance, the appraiser chose to capitalize income of a parcel
of improved real property used for rental purposes, but instead of using
the actual figures, he assumed a higher square foot rental rate and a
lower vacancy rate than the property historically commanded, and he
assumed a lower amount of operating expenses than was actually
experienced (thereby overstating income and producing an inflated
value), what recourse would the property owner have if the appraisal
was too high?78 The property appraiser would assert that based on his
expertise and perhaps on income figures from surrounding properties, it
is reasonable to assume that the property, if properly managed, would
produce more rental income than it has historically produced. How
would one prove that the value so determined by the property appraiser
was not supported by a "reasonable hypothesis"?
In this connection, consider the Florida Supreme Court's startling
observation in 1984 in Blake v. Xerox Corp.:79 "Regardless of which
method was theoretically superior, the trial court was bound to uphold
the appraiser's determination if it was lawfully arrived at and within the
range of reasonable appraisals, that is, if it was supported by any
reasonable hypothesis of legality."8 In other words, even if it was clear
to the court that the method used by the property appraiser was likely
to overvalue the property, and that another method would be "theoreti-

77. See supra text accompanying notes 9-13.
78. Several years ago, in an arms-length transaction, my wife and I purchased a
commercial office building in Alachua County, Florida. Shortly after the purchase and with full
knowledge of the facts, the county property appraiser valued the building at more than we had
paid for it. A conference with the property appraiser brought no relief but revealed that the
appraiser had not visited the property to ascertain its condition, and had used the capitalization
of income approach based on higher occupancy and rent rates than the property had historically
enjoyed, and lower operating expenses than the property had historically enjoyed. Our petition
to the value adjustment board was also to no avail. The master hearing the matter concluded that
the value determined by the parties in an arms length transaction (the classic "fair market
value") was insufficient to overcome the extraordinary burden. As a result, the "fair market
value" for tax purposes was not the "fair market value" as determined in an open market
purchase, but a number created by the property appraiser using a rent rate, occupancy rate, and
expense ratio that the appraiser knew bore no relation to the property in question. It was that
experience that sparked my interest in this issue.
79. 447 So. 2d 1348 (Fla. 1984).
80. Id. at 1350.
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cally superior," the court had to support the property appraiser's
determination if there was any reasonable hypothesis of legality.8 The
imperial appraiser was not, as the Florida Supreme Court understood the
Constitution, bound by the mandate that property be assessed at its fair
market value.82 Rather, the appraiser was permitted to ignore the
property's fair market value, and would prevail so long as he picked his
chosen value from a range of reasonable appraisals. 3
There is, of course, a sound basis for affording the property appraiser
a presumption of correctness. Because of the wide range of values that
qualified appraisers might assign to a given piece of property, unless the
property appraiser's value were given a presumption of correctness,
property owners might contest even perceived minor overvaluations.
However, the wide range of theoretically plausible values supports not
only giving property appraisers a presumption of correctness, but also
incorporating in the taxing scheme independent review of the property
appraisers' determinations. As Judge Parker recognized in his 1847
opinion in Livingston, some recourse "is necessary to the protection of
'
the rights of the citizen against mistake or abuse."84
Ironically, "proof beyond a reasonable doubt" that the shift from
"fair market value" to "any value within a range of values" led to abuse
is apparent from a presentation made by the Dade County property
appraiser to the legislature last year when H.B. 557 was being considered." The property appraiser asserted that under H.B. 557, Dade
County would lose "MORE THAN 12 MILLION DOLLARS DUE TO
LITIGATION" and "MORE THAN 55 MILLION DOLLARS THROUGH
THE VAB PROCESS" (emphasis supplied by the property appraiser).8 6
Based on the 27.5 mill tax rate, this sixty-seven million dollar projected
tax loss is equivalent to approximately 2.4 billion dollars of property
valuation. 7 In other words, the Dade County property appraiser did not
want property owners to have recourse to an independent review of his
assessments because they would be able to show, by the preponderance
of the evidence, that their property has been overvalued by 2.4 billion

81. Id. at 1350-51.
82. See id. at 1351 (stating that because the trial court found the appraiser's decision
reasonable, the trial court should have upheld that decision).
83. See id. ("[Tihe only questions presented by the instant case are whether the appraiser
considered all factors mandated by the law and whether his methods and conclusion are
supported by any reasonable hypothesis of a legal assessment.").
84. Livingston, 4 Barb. at 13.
85. Presentation by the Property Appraiser of Dade County, Fiscal Impact of HB-557/SB740 (1996) (on file with author).
86. Id.
87. Id.
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dollars!8" The fact that the Dade County property appraiser is aware
that he has overvalued property by 2.4 billion dollars,89 based on a
preponderance of the evidence standard, clearly demonstrates the abuse
possible under the "range of values" substitute for the constitutionally
mandated "fair market value" based taxation.
An interesting facet of the Dade County property appraiser's study
is the fact that he used loss of tax revenue as the principal reason why
the current system should not be changed.' One might well question
the propriety of the Dade County property appraiser's appearance before
the legislature to express his concern about lost revenue. His assigned
duty is to identify the "just valuation" of property.9 Should he fulfill
that duty without concern for the amount of revenue that will be
generated? The conflict of interest between being responsible for
determining fair market value and being interested in maximizing
revenue is palpable. Given the dollar value of the overvaluation, which
he acknowledged, it is clear that his concern about lost revenue has
affected his valuations and overburdened some Dade County property
owners.
C. Governor Chiles' Veto
Last year, when it became apparent that Governor Chiles was
considering vetoing H.B. 557, 1 wrote the Governor and encouraged him
to let the bill become law. Although he disregarded my unsolicited
advice, he did respond to my letter and explain why he vetoed the
bill.92 He expressed his concern that the proposed change would have
an adverse impact on local governments and schools and that if a
change were to be made it should be made with the facts in hand and
in a manner that would let the taxing authorities plan their responses.93
He also noted that the "Save Our Homes" initiative already restricts
growth in property values.94
As he understood it, the adverse impact would be "lost annual
revenues ranging from $70 million initially to close to $500 million
eventually."95 It may well be that continuing a known misallocation of
88. Id.
89. See id.
90. See id.
91. See FLA. CONST. art. Vii, § 4 (stating that the law should be designed to achieve a
"just valuation of all property for ad valorem taxation").
92. Letter from Lawton Chiles, Governor of Florida, to David M. Richardson (June 19,

1996) (on file with author) [hereinafter Governor's Letter].
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id.
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the ad valorem tax burden for one year to provide the affected taxing
authorities with time to plan was more important, or more politically
expedient, at the time of the veto, than making an effort to abide by the
constitutional mandate that the ad valorem tax burden be fairly
apportioned among property owners.96 However, whatever merit the
"planning time" argument may have had last year, it no longer supports
denying Florida property owners that which every other state affords its
property owners-a reasonable opportunity to challenge property
appraisers' valuations.
One other concern the Governor expressed was the "substantially
higher litigation costs" that might result from increased valuation
challenges.97 There will always be valuation disputes in an ad valorem
tax system. But, a certain way to maximize the number of such disputes
is to adopt a system in which the property appraiser, unchecked by
oversight and concerned about maximizing revenue, is given the
freedom to select a value from among a range of values, is not required
to seek the fair market value, and is permitted to use a technically
inferior method of selecting such value from among the range of values.
A strong argument can be made that opening the courthouse doors and
forcing the property appraiser to select the value that most accurately
reflects fair market value, rather than permitting him to select any value
from a range of values, would reduce the number of valuation disputes.
Finally, a word should be said about the Governor's observation in
his letter that: "The average taxpayer would have benefitted little from
this bill."98 From an economic point of view, this may be true. Many
Floridians don't own taxable property. Others own only their home, and
homes typically are assessed enough below the prevailing market to
forestall valuation challenges. But surely, the fact that many Floridians
would not individually "benefit" from the bill (other than in the
undeniable sense that everyone benefits when our constitutional structure
is respected) is not a reason for continuing a system that, in contravention of any reasonable interpretation of the constitutional mandate,
imposes a heavier tax burden on some property owners than on others
who are similarly situated. The fundamental tax policy norm of taxing
similarly situated persons similarly, which is embedded in the "just
valuation" mandate of the Constitution, demands fairness for all
taxpayers.

96. See FLA. CONST. art. VII, § 4.
97. Governor's Letter, supra note 92.
98. Id.
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D. The Level of the Burden
Although the Florida Constitution says nothing about affording
property appraisers the protection of a high burden of proof, and there
are persuasive arguments for removing that barrier to objective review
of property appraisers' determinations, one might at least expect the
underlying rationale for creating and imposing a high burden of proof
in certain cases to support imposing such a burden in ad valorem tax
cases. Insight into the underlying rationale can be gleaned from In re
Winship,99 decided by the United States Supreme Court in 1970. In that
case, the Court reversed a New York Court of Appeals decision and, for
the first time, held that in criminal matters proof beyond a reasonable
doubt is required by the Due Process Clause of the Constitution."° The
Court observed that a criminal defendant " 'has at stake an interest of
transcending value,' " 1 -his liberty-and the proof beyond a reasonable doubt burden serves the important purpose of minimizing the
possibility that an innocent person would be found guilty and imprisoned. 2 The Court emphasized this point by agreeing with and quoting
from the dissent in the New York Court of Appeals case: "[A] person
accused of a crime.., would be at a severe disadvantage, a disadvantage amounting to a lack of fundamental fairness, if he could be
adjudged guilty and imprisoned for years on the strength of the same
evidence as would suffice in a civil case. ''""B Accordingly, the question
for Florida ad valorem tax purposes becomes: What state "interest of
transcending value" is at stake in a valuation dispute that would justify
requiring property owners who do not agree with property appraisers'
valuations to meet a burden of proof that in some cases is almost as
high as that the state must meet to deprive an individual of his liberty?
The answer is that no such state interest of transcending value is at
stake.
If, as Justice Harlan said in his concurring opinion in Winship, the
level of the burden of proof reflects "a very fundamental assessment of
the comparative social costs of erroneous factual determinations,"'"
then the high burden imposed in valuation disputes is completely
unfounded. All that is at stake is money. Indeed, the money in question
is not even that involved in a civil suit between private parties where an

99.
100.
101.
102.
103.

397 U.S. 357 (1970).
Id. at 364.
Id. (quoting Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 525-26 (1958)).
Id. at 363-64.
Id. at 363 (quoting 24 N.Y.2d at 205, 247 N.E.2d at 259).

104. Id. at 370 (Harlan, J., concurring).
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error in favor of one party is no more serious than an error in favor of
another party."5
The money in question is taxes-that which the government extracts
from its citizens in order to fund its operations. Throughout history,
taxation has been a highly sensitive political issue and one that often
contributes to distrust of the government. Judged by Justice Harlan's
"comparative social costs of erroneous factual determinations" test,"
the least acceptable error is one that imposes an erroneously high tax
burden on a citizen. To protect against the error of overassessment, the
burden imposed on a property owner should be low-not high.
Whatever administrative convenience accrues to the system by closing
the courthouse doors to valuation challenges is outweighed by fairness-which is by far the most important interest of transcending value
in any modem tax system.
The case for providing Florida property owners access to an
objective review of property appraisers' determinations need not rest on
any one individual's assertion of what constitutes "fairness" in a tax
system. We have the experience of not only all of the other states to
draw from but also that of the federal government. No other state has
found protecting the property appraisers' valuations to be an interest of
transcending value. Every other state provided easier access to objective
review of property appraisers' determinations than did Florida prior to
the recent legislation, and many provide easier access than that available
under the legislation. Even federal income, estate and gift tax disputes,
which often hinge on determinations of value, are resolved by the
traditional, civil suit "preponderance of the evidence" standard.
What abiding state interest is unique to Florida property appraisers
that, even under the recently adopted legislation, requires great deference
to the property appraisers' valuations? Is it, as the property appraisers
would have us believe, that Florida property appraisers are constitutional
officers whose actions are unchallengeable? While perhaps not legally
rigorous, my answer to that question is "nonsense." Nothing in the
Constitution supports any such result. To the extent there was any
substance to the argument, it arose from the issue of the limited
jurisdiction of courts of equity. 7 But in 1969, the legislature, pursuant
to the authority expressly granted in the Constitution, shifted jurisdiction
of ad valorem valuation issues to courts at law, thereby fatally undermining the "constitutional officer" argument.' True, courts of equity

105.
106.
107.
108.

See id. at 371 (Harlan, J., concurring).
Id. at 370 (Harlan, J., concurring).
See supra notes 27-35 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 43-45 and accompanying text.
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normally will not interfere with property appraisers' determinations. But
oversight of property appraisers' determinations is critical to a just
system, and courts at law should not be constrained by the historic
limitations on the jurisdiction of courts of equity."9
IV. WHERE Do WE Go FROM HERE?

The obvious answer to the question--'"Where do we go from
here"?-is to reduce the burden of proof required of property owners to
successfully challenge property appraisers' valuations. H.B. 557's
preponderance of the evidence standard"' was neither unprecedented
nor unreasonable. H.B.557 should be reintroduced, adopted and signed
into law by the Governor.
The recently enacted legislation, which follows verbatim the
Governor's task force's proposal,"' is awkwardly worded and starts
with the proposition that the property appraiser's valuation is presumed
to be correct."' To overcome the presumption, the taxpayer must
prove "by clear and convincing evidence that the appraiser's assessment

109. See supra notes 27-35 and accompanying text.
110. H.B. 557, S.B. 740 (Fla. 1996).

111. Compare 1997 Fla. Laws ch. 97-85, § 3 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 194.301
(1997)) with TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 20, at 3. The statute was created to read:
In any administrative or judicial action in which a taxpayer challenges an ad
valorem tax assessment of value, the property appraiser's assessment shall be
presumed correct. This presumption of correctness is lost if the taxpayer shows by
a preponderance of the evidence that either the property appraiser has failed to
consider properly the criteria in s. 193.011 or if the property appraiser's assessment
is arbitrarily based on appraisal practices which are different from the appraisal
practices generally applied by the property appraiser to comparable property within
the same class and within the same county. If the presumption of correctness is
lost, the taxpayer shall have the burden of proving by a preponderance of the
evidence that the appraiser's assessment is in excess of just value. If the
presumption of correctness is retained, the taxpayer shall have the burden of
proving by clear and convincing evidence that the appraiser's assessment is in
excess of just value. In no case shall the taxpayer have the burden of proving that
the property appraiser's assessment is not supported by any reasonable hypothesis
of a legal assessment. If the property appraiser's assessment is determined to be
erroneous, the Value Adjustment Board or the court can establish the assessment
if there exists competent, substantial evidence in the record, which cumulatively
meets the requirements of s. 193.011. If the record lacks competent, substantial
evidence meeting the just value criteria of s. 193.011, the matter shall be remanded
to the property appraiser with appropriate directions from the Value Adjustment
Board or the court.
112. 1997 Fla. Laws ch. 97-85, § 3.
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is in excess of just value.' ' . The statute expressly precludes either the
value adjustment board or the circuit courts from imposing the
extraordinary burden."4 On its face, this would seem to open the
courthouse doors; how wide open is still a question.
Unfortunately, the burden of proof problem is not likely to be solved
by establishing a "clear and convincing" standard, because the courts
have found any value within a range of values to be acceptable." 5 The
range of values approach, coupled with the moderately high, clear and
convincing burden of proof (or, for that matter, even the preponderance
of the evidence burden of proof) might well serve as a surrogate for the
extraordinary burden. This approach would more likely achieve the
desired result if it were stated clearly that the goal is to determine the
fair market value," 6 and that it is not acceptable for the property
appraiser merely to determine any value within a range of theoretically
plausible values.
The new law includes a second tier, which provides a more favorable
approach. If the taxpayer can show, by a preponderance of the evidence,
that either "the property appraiser has failed to consider properly the
criteria in s. 193.011 or... the property appraiser's assessment is
arbitrarily based on appraisal practices which are different from the
appraisal practices generally applied by the property appraiser to
comparable property within the same class and within the same
county,""' 7 then, the property appraiser's presumption of correctness
is lost."' In the absence of the presumption of correctness, the
taxpayer's burden becomes that of "proving by a preponderance of the
' 19
evidence that the appraiser's assessment is in excess of just value.""
If applicable, this second tier alternative would seem to open the
courthouse doors widely.
However, both policy and interpretive questions abound. From a
policy perspective, one may ask why, if the property appraiser's
valuation is wrong, should the burden of proof imposed on a property
owner depend on the reason the appraiser is wrong? What justification
is there for some challenges to be governed by the clear and convincing
standard while others are governed by the preponderance of the evidence
standard?

113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.

1997 Fla. Laws ch. 97-85, § 3.
1997 Fla. Laws ch. 97-85, § 3.
See supra text accompanying notes 79-83.
See TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 20, at 3 (referring only to just value).
1997 Fla. Laws ch. 97-85, § 3.
1997 Fla. Laws ch. 97-85, § 3.
1997 Fla. Laws ch. 97-85, § 3.
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As to interpretive matters, how does one demonstrate that "the
property appraiser has failed to consider properly the criteria in s.
2 Current case law leaves no doubt that the property
193.011? '"'
appraiser's testimony that he has considered the criteria is sufficient
consideration."' It may be that failing to consider is not the same as
failing to consider properly, but how much difference will the courts see
between these two points? In fact, why should we create a new legal
battleground when the simple question is what is the fair market value
of the property?
Further, how does one establish that the property appraiser's value
is "based on appraisal practices [that] are [arbitrarily] different from the
appraisal practices generally applied by the property appraiser to
comparable property within the same class and within the same
county"?" This is a troublesome question because it creates three new
legal battlegrounds-what appraisal practices were applied to property,
when was the use of a different method arbitrary, and what is the
definition of comparable property. This significant new complexity is
fertile ground for litigation and is both unnecessary and undesirable
when the simple question is, what is the fair market value of the
property?
The creation of two classes of property owners for burden of proof
purposes is, at the least, problematic. A far better, and much less
complex, solution would be to establish as the applicable standard for
all valuation challenges the "preponderance of the evidence" standard." Conventional wisdom, though, might lead us not to question
the availability of the preponderance of the evidence standard. If
property owners can qualify for this standard of proof, that's fine. If not,
the "clear and convincing" general rule is still an improvement over the
prior law. However, this will be true only in the, perhaps unlikely, event
that Florida courts approach the "clear and convincing" standard without
the baggage of the case law out of which arose the extraordinary
burden 24 and, in particular, without continuing the "range of values"
analysis."

120. See 1997 Fla. Laws ch. 97-85, § 3; see also FLA. STAT. § 193.011 (setting forth the
criteria for property appraisals).
121. See supra text accompanying notes 79-83.
122. See 1997 Fla. Laws ch. 97-85, § 3.
123. A significant contribution of the statute is the express grant of authority to the value
adjustment board and the circuit courts to determine the value if the property appraiser's
assessment is determined to be wrong and the record provides enough information for a revised
value to be determined. See 1997 Fla. Laws ch. 97-85, § 3.
124. See supra text accompanying notes 30-42.
125. See supra text accompanying notes 79-83.
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The last, but nonetheless important, point to be made about the new
legislation has to do with the effective date provision. It states that the
new law will "first apply to assessments included in [the] January 1,
1997 tax roll. ' 12 6 Under this rule, challenges to earlier year tax rolls
will still be governed by the extraordinary burden. This prospective
application of the new rule is inconsistent with the fact that the raison
d'etre for the task force was to address an existing fundamental problem
with Florida's ad valorem tax system-the absence of effective
independent review of property appraisers' determinations. 7 This
problem is not limited to new valuation challenges, and the legislation
addressing the problem should not be so limited either. Furthermore, in
the case of multiple year challenges straddling and including the 1997
tax roll, the extraordinary burden might apply to early years, while
either the clear and convincing burden or the preponderance of the
evidence burden might apply to later years. There is no sound policy
basis for creating this burden of proof morass.
Finally, however the level of the burden of proof issue is resolved,
the legislature should make it clear that the price arrived at in a
contemporaneous, arms-length, fair market value, purchase (appropriately discounted) should be given great, if not controlling, weight. No
theoretical calculations by the property appraiser can be a better
determinant of fair market value than the price arrived at in such a
transaction.

126. See 1997 Fla. Laws ch. 97-85, § 3.
127. See TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 20, at 2 (stating that it is of "tremendous importance to citizens" to have "a fair and impartial ad valorem tax assessment process").
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